APEC Gyeongju Summit: A Competitive and Cooperative Arena Where China, the United States, Japan, South Korea, and Russia Each Have Their Own Concerns

On October 31, the 2025 APEC Summit opened in Gyeongju, South Korea. Leaders and senior representatives from 21 economies in Asia and the Pacific region attended the meeting. APEC meetings have always focused mainly on economic issues, but they also include exchanges and negotiations among all parties in the fields of geopolitics, military affairs, and culture. Among the more than 20 APEC members, China, the United States, Japan, South Korea, and Russia, whose national power and international influence are strong, have long received prominent attention. Compared with the relatively low-key posture of other countries, these five nations participate in the summit agenda and games more confidently. This time is no exception.

As the world’s two largest economies, the movements of the United States and China, as well as the economic and diplomatic relations between the two, are the most important and most closely watched.

Since Donald Trump’s second inauguration as President of the United States, he has struck foreign countries with “heavy blows,” especially by using tariffs as weapons, imposing large tariffs on both competitors and traditional allies, leaving all of America’s trading partners at a loss. China and the United States are each other’s largest trading partners and also the main competitors. China refuses to “bow down,” and Trump’s tariff stick is thus aimed at China even more harshly. In the past few months, in the China–U.S. tariff war, the tariff rates of both sides once rose to more than 100%.

Before the Busan meeting between the Chinese and U.S. leaders, both sides released goodwill toward each other—China increased purchases of American soybeans, and the United States also reduced tariffs on Chinese goods. At the summit, both sides also showed further willingness to compromise. Under normal circumstances, this would obviously be a positive signal. But Trump is not a conventional leader—what he says often “changes three times a day,” his words spoken casually but lacking credibility. The Chinese side, on the other hand, responded smoothly without making real commitments. Therefore, although the talks went smoothly and China–U.S. relations seemed to be warming up, there was actually no substantive progress.

The fundamental reason why China–U.S. relations lack substantive progress lies in the fact that the two sides are not only in economic competition but also in comprehensive competition and confrontation. In recent years, the United States has clearly regarded China as a competitor to be contained and has tried to “decouple” from it. Although the Trump administration is not as active as the Democratic Party and the traditional establishment in pressuring China on human rights issues, it is more aggressive in the economic and military fields. Meanwhile, the increasingly rising China is no longer willing to compromise as in the past and has turned to confront the United States “head-on.” The two sides also have military confrontations over the South China Sea and the Taiwan issue, both refusing to give way. With the tension like drawn swords, the relations between the two countries cannot fundamentally ease.

The APEC Gyeongju Summit is also a stage for China and the United States to display their own strength and positions and to win over third parties. Before the summit, Trump had already visited Malaysia and Japan, achieving considerable results, consolidating the U.S.–Japan alliance, and expanding Japan’s market. South Korea’s left-wing President Lee Jae-myung also warmly welcomed Trump and presented him with gifts. Relying on its strong national power and old influence, Trump ensured that Japan and South Korea firmly stood on the side of the United States in the field of security while maintaining close cooperation in the economy.

However, Trump has never liked the traditional multilateral alliance model and is unwilling to establish long-term and stable relations with allies. Japan is an exception, but Trump finds it difficult to maintain friendly cooperation with other traditional allies. This weakens the influence of the United States and reduces its advantages in its confrontation with China.

At the same time, China is also wooing Japan, South Korea, and other APEC member states. Xi Jinping’s visit to South Korea this time was not only to attend the APEC summit but also an official state visit to South Korea, where he met for the first time with Lee Jae-myung, who had been elected a few months earlier. As South Korea’s “neighbor” and largest trading partner, China, though unable to shake the U.S.–South Korea alliance, can prevent South Korea from completely leaning toward the United States and can maintain close cooperation in the fields of economy, trade, science, and culture.

China also expressed a positive attitude toward Japan’s new prime minister, Sanae Takaichi, who has a very strong right-wing inclination and whose opposition to China on historical and strategic issues is obvious, thus promoting the meeting between Xi Jinping and Takaichi. This also shows that China does not want historical and political issues to affect its economic and trade partnership with Japan and continues to unswervingly implement the long-term strategy of wooing Japan and countering the United States. Even though this year marks the 80th anniversary of the victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan, China still maintains restraint and goodwill toward Japan. For China’s rulers, political stability and economic development must override historical justice and other issues.

Whether it is this APEC Summit or other diplomatic initiatives by China, their fundamental purpose is political stability and economic development. China is highly pragmatic, willing to set aside various differences and ideological prejudices for the sake of economic interests. However, the Chinese authorities place the interests of the ruling group above all else, even above the nation’s overall interests, including economic ones.

At this summit, China’s efforts to woo Japan, South Korea, and other countries to counter the U.S. blockade and sanctions are directly motivated by geopolitical rivalry, but at its core, it is still about regime interests and stability. Based on this logic, China is instead willing to make concessions on many issues—especially to countries other than the United States, including Japan and South Korea.

China has also released goodwill to other APEC members, especially developing countries, in order to win them over from pro-U.S. positions toward closer ties with China. China has long used “South–South cooperation” and other means to establish close relations with developing countries, and in the past decade it has also exported the “Chinese model” to counter the Western developed countries represented by the G7. China has long been weak in politics and soft power but strong in economics, so it makes more active use of its strong economic power and economic platforms like APEC to develop relations, promote its strategic interests, and gain competitive advantages over the United States. Of course, other countries are not obediently used and manipulated by China and the United States; they also take advantage of the needs of both sides and of the China–U.S. confrontation to obtain their own benefits. Japan and South Korea are both developed economies with strong national power and will not be manipulated by China and the United States at will.

Since the Cold War, Japan has always benefited from the confrontation between China and the United States. Now that China–U.S. relations are tense, Japan continues to avoid offending either side while “making a fortune quietly.” Although the new Japanese prime minister, Sanae Takaichi, holds an extreme right-wing position, she, like the representative of Japan’s new right-wing, Shinzo Abe, is pragmatic in diplomacy, especially in trade. For example, she gave up attending the recent autumn festival at the Yasukuni Shrine. Japan needs active economic and trade relations with China to boost its sluggish economy. A few days ago, Takaichi reached several agreements with the visiting Trump, and her meeting with Xi Jinping at this summit is also expected to go smoothly. Although China and Japan are opposed on historical issues, the Chinese leadership has always been pragmatic and generally will not let historical issues affect economic exchanges. If Japan gains dual economic support from both the United States and China, its economy is indeed expected to recover and reproduce the prosperity of the Abe era and earlier times.

Japan is also wooing “southern countries” to expand its support. A few days ago, Takaichi visited Malaysia and attended the ASEAN summit, also consolidating Japan’s presence and influence in Southeast Asia. Japan is relatively weaker than China and the United States but has a sense of superiority among developing countries. Japan will not pin all its hopes on China and the United States. The Southeast Asian and Latin American countries, as well as Canada and Australia participating in the APEC meeting, are all Japan’s traditional friends and partners.

Compared with the relatively powerful Japan, South Korea’s situation is more difficult. Although South Korea is the host country of this APEC, the domestic and international situations make President Lee Jae-myung, the ruling leader, face great pressure and unable to relax. Over the years, South Korea, like Japan, has courted countries beyond China and the United States and has achieved considerable results. But because of limited national strength and weak international foundations, South Korea’s influence in Southeast Asia and Latin America is far less than that of China, the United States, and Japan.

In South Korea, the confrontation between the left and the right is severe. After the attempted coup by Yoon Suk-yeol, the already divided South Korea became even less harmonious. South Korea’s economy and technology, after decades of development, have achieved remarkable success, but they have also entered a bottleneck stage. Although South Korea’s GDP continues to rise and has surpassed Japan’s, the problems of the wealth gap, high housing prices, and low fertility rate have long been old issues that neither left-wing nor right-wing governments can effectively solve.

In foreign affairs, South Korea also faces the embarrassment of having to “choose sides” between China and the United States, trying to “offend neither,” but possibly being alienated by both. Lee Jae-myung’s consecutive meetings with Trump and Xi Jinping within a few days produced limited substantive results and only limited improvement in South Korea’s relations with the United States and China. Although Lee has dealt with historical grievances with Japan in a low-key manner, as a left-wing president, he will not be truly pro-Japanese, and he also faces Japan’s unfriendly attitude and pressure. The recent large-scale anti-China demonstrations in South Korea have also cast a shadow over the APEC summit and increased the pressure on the Lee Jae-myung government.

Faced with many challenges, South Korea’s choices are limited. South Korea is important to both China and the United States but not as important as Japan. The South Korea–U.S. relationship cannot reach the closeness of the Japan–U.S. relationship. At present, South Korea still maintains its old strategy of “security relying on the United States, economy and trade close to China,” and also avoids controversial issues such as Taiwan. This is indeed the least bad choice at the moment. South Korea can also deepen cooperation with China in economy and trade to avoid confrontation and can seek China’s support on northern peninsula issues such as the North Korean nuclear problem. However, if the confrontation between China and the United States intensifies and the international environment further deteriorates, it will become increasingly difficult for South Korea to maintain its current line. Obviously, China is not a reliable ally for South Korea; by then, South Korea will inevitably move closer to the United States, and may once again become the front line of the China–U.S. conflict.

Another important participant in this summit, Russia, sent only its deputy prime minister. In the early 2000s, Russia was once the third most important player at APEC summits after China and the United States, when President Putin often personally attended. But after the outbreak of the Russia–Ukraine war, Russia suffered international sanctions, and Putin was wanted by the International Criminal Court. Russia was forced to keep a “low profile” at international conferences, including APEC. Not only could Putin not attend the summit, but the Russian representatives also received a cold reception and “sat on the cold bench,” being unwelcome.

This is also the consequence of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and its trampling on international law, triggering the punitive mechanisms of the modern international system. The price is the decline of Russia’s international influence, the fall of its voice in the world, and serious damage to Russia’s national interests.

Of course, Russia will not come away from the APEC summit with nothing. APEC is one of the few large-scale summits that Russia can still attend. Having been heavily sanctioned and surrounded, Russia’s participation in APEC is also an opportunity to seek external support, improve its economy, and resist the West. Russia is rich in natural resources, and even U.S. allies such as Japan and South Korea still need part of Russia’s energy supply. Third World countries dissatisfied with the West also share common language with Russia. Therefore, at this summit, Russia will also take many actions under a low profile.

Not only the five countries—China, the United States, Japan, South Korea, and Russia—but other APEC members will also use the opportunity of the summit to expand their influence and form alliances. However, the strength and level of activity of these countries are not comparable to the above five. Countries such as Canada and Australia, though economically developed, and Indonesia and Mexico, with large populations, mainly focus on developing their economies quietly, not overly involving themselves in great-power rivalry, but instead hoping to gain some benefits from it.

Because APEC members span multiple continents, with different levels of development and differing political systems, their positions and interests naturally vary greatly. Internal disputes and mutual competition have always existed over the years. Compared with the turn of the century, when globalization was in full swing, today’s world is more divided. The APEC summit, on the one hand, maintains economic and trade cooperation among the main Asia-Pacific economies, and on the other hand, provides a platform for all sides to engage in fierce open and covert struggles.

At present, among APEC members, the only “common bottom line” is probably economic interests, while there is no longer consensus in other areas. It is valuable that all parties are still willing to continue cooperating and negotiating for the sake of economy and trade. But when there are only interests without deeper alignment of ideas, it is merely superficial unity. In today’s trend of deglobalization, with all countries advocating “national interests first,” APEC’s prospects are not optimistic. It will still exist for a long time in the future, but more as a battlefield where all parties harbor their own agendas rather than a cooperative platform working in concert.

Wang Qingmin(Chinese writer and researcher on international politics residing in Europe)